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Abstract
Individuals subtly reminded of death, coalitional challenges, or feelings of uncertainty display
exaggerated preferences for affirmations and against criticisms of their cultural in-groups. Terror
management, coalitional psychology, and uncertainty management theories postulate this
“worldview defense” effect as the output of mechanisms evolved either to allay the fear of death,
foster social support, or reduce anxiety by increasing adherence to cultural values. In 4 studies, we
report evidence for an alternative perspective. We argue that worldview defense owes to
unconscious vigilance, a state of accentuated reactivity to affective targets (which need not relate
to cultural worldviews) that follows detection of subtle alarm cues (which need not pertain to
death, coalitional challenges, or uncertainty). In Studies 1 and 2, death-primed participants
produced exaggerated ratings of worldview-neutral affective targets. In Studies 3 and 4,
subliminal threat manipulations unrelated to death, coalitional challenges, or uncertainty evoked
worldview defense. These results are discussed as they inform evolutionary interpretations of
worldview defense and future investigations of the influence of unconscious alarm on judgment.
Keywords
worldview defense; subliminal threat; terror management theory; coalitional psychology;
uncertainty management theory
Conscious thought is effortful and slow. In a perilous, ever-changing world, we cannot rely
on reflective processes to mobilize responsiveness to subtle indications of threat (Liddell et
al., 2005). We propose that this need is served by unconscious vigilance: increased
sensitivity to affective stimuli initiated by alarming cues processed below the threshold of
conscious awareness.
Theoretically, unconscious vigilance heightens reactions to stimuli affectively indexed as
resources or hazards by intensifying the acuity with which they are perceived.1 For instance,
© 2011 American Psychological Association
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Colin Holbrook, Center for Behavior, Evolution, and Culture,
Department of Anthropology, 341 Haines Hall Box 951553, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1553.
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1For purposes of exposition, we use the term affect in a comprehensive sense including emotions, moods, and undifferentiated
valenced states (for a review of affect typologies, see Prinz, 2004).
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a hiker may register positively regarded environmental targets, such as a secure nearby
cabin, with enhanced salience after peripherally glimpsing a grizzly through dense trees.
Alternately, the same unconsciously vigilant hiker might react with greater and more
immediate aversion should the grizzly step into the open. As these examples illustrate,
unconscious vigilance can potentiate responsiveness to an eliciting stimulus (e.g., the
grizzly) or to other integrally related targets (e.g., the cabin refuge). Importantly,
unconscious vigilance should also accentuate sensitivity to affective stimuli that are
incidental to the eliciting trigger. For example, our unconsciously vigilant hiker might
encounter a sun-dappled stream with greater pleasure or a discarded beer can with greater
annoyance.
A wide cognitive neuroscience literature supports the existence of unconscious vigilance
(for a review, see L. M. Williams et al., 2006). The amygdala, for example, is
conceptualized as a kind of searchlight that directs perception and attention to either threat
or reward stimuli of motivational significance (Barrett, 2006; Berridge, 1999; Holland &
Gallagher, 1999; Wager et al., 2008). Upon exposure to subtle threats (e.g., subliminal
fearful faces), the amygdala is theorized to excite brain stem mechanisms that innervate
broad regions of the brain, “accessing the cortex to further the evaluation of significant
stimuli and to facilitate automatic orienting and the eventual experience of emotion within
awareness” (Liddell et al., 2005, p. 241). The amygdala and the anterior cingulate have both
been implicated in “alarm” reactions to unconsciously processed affective stimuli,
particularly cues of threat (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004; LeDoux, 1996; Lieberman,
2007; Whalen et al., 1998), including counterfactual thoughts of prospective threat
(Nitschke et al., 2009). In contrast, conscious detection of threat activates higher cortical
areas, enabling topdown control of behavioral responses (L. M. Williams et al., 2006) and
inhibiting alarm signals in the amygdala (Hariri, Bookheimer, & Mazziotta, 2000;
Lieberman et al., 2007) and the anterior cingulate (Lieberman et al., 2004). Thus, to
influence evaluation, subtle cues must be alarming enough to arouse unconscious vigilance
but not so alarming as to recruit conscious awareness and emotion regulation.
Our phylogenetic cousins appear to share the capacity to heighten reactivity to affective
stimuli upon detecting subtle alarm cues. For example, Herry et al. (2007) compared the
influence of random tone intervals (i.e., subtle cues of environmental unpredictability) on
the reactions of mice and humans to affective stimuli. In both species, the random interval
manipulation induced hyper-responsiveness in the amygdala coupled with behavior
indicative of accentuated reactivity to affective targets: Mice sought enclosed spaces more
avidly, and humans were more sensitive to angry faces in a dot-probe task despite the
absence of self-reported changes in their conscious emotional awareness. In a conceptually
similar study manipulating subtle visual cues of alarm, van den Bos et al. (2008) found that
exposure to either background exclamation marks in a laboratory setting or blinking lights
across the street in field studies increased self-reported anger toward injustice (e.g., vignettes
involving unfair employment practices). Consistent with the unconscious vigilance
perspective, and just as Herry et al. found with their manipulation of random tone intervals,
the “alarmed” participants in the injustice studies did not report conscious awareness of
emotional upset despite showing significantly intensified reactivity to affective targets.
When alarm cues register unconsciously, consciously perceived affective stimuli appear to
evoke exaggerated reactions but not awareness of having shifted into a state of vigilance.
Unconscious vigilance appears likely to operate in the aftermath of initially conscious alarm
reactions as well as when initiated by subtle alarm cues present in the immediate
surroundings. Several minutes after narrowly avoiding a fender-bender, for example, an
unconsciously vigilant driver might respond to a catchy song with greater relish, or to a
disagreeable talk radio rant with greater repellence. In this manner, unconscious vigilance
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may bias evaluations of incidental targets, including complex cultural stimuli, by
intensifying the pleasantness or aversiveness with which they are later perceived. Indeed,
numerous studies have found that initially conscious reminders of threats that do not
subsequently arouse conscious distress engender a form of evaluation bias termed
worldview defense—the polarization of ratings for pleasant and against aversive cultural
attitudes (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; Kirkpatrick & Navarrete, 2006;
McGregor, 2006). In what follows, we argue that researchers investigating worldview
defense, although motivated by unrelated theoretical frameworks, have generated evidence
that unconscious vigilance can bias incidental evaluations of pleasant or aversive cultural
stimuli.
Worldview defense has been demonstrated to follow subtle or entirely subliminal threats in
hundreds of experiments conducted over roughly the past two decades, and has become the
subject of considerable controversy (e.g., Kirkpatrick & Navarrete, 2006; Landau, Solomon,
Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 2007; McGregor, 2006). Terror management theory, coalitional
psychology, and uncertainty management theory2 advance distinct proposals of the
evolutionary origins of worldview defense (Greenberg et al., 1997; McGregor, 2006;
Navarrete, 2005). Our primary aim in this article is to test whether the effects reported in the
worldview defense literature are more parsimoniously explained by unconscious vigilance
or a cognitive architecture specially related to the endorsement of group values, as each of
the previous theories has maintained. A corollary goal of the experiments reported here is to
test whether unconscious vigilance biases evaluations of incidental valenced targets, from
simple aesthetic stimuli to ideological cultural essays, in the theorized manner. Before
proceeding to our studies, we first summarize current debates between the terror, coalition,
and uncertainty management perspectives on worldview defense, then we critique prior
attempts to rule out alternative explanations such as unconscious vigilance.
Functional Accounts of Worldview Defense
We begin with a rough overview of the prior accounts of worldview defense before
examining each in greater detail. Terror management theory attributes worldview defense to
a psychological system designed to suppress the fear of death via identification with cultural
worldviews, which are thought to confer a sort of symbolic immortality (Greenberg et al.,
1997; Landau et al., 2007). The mortality-salience hypothesis asserts that once thoughts of
death become salient, a specialized “death anxiety buffer” weakens such that worldviews
must be endorsed more emphatically to keep the fear of death at bay (Greenberg et al.,
1990). Alternatively, the coalitional psychology interpretation holds that death cues trigger
worldview defense because typical causes of death in the ancestral past were amenable to
social support (Navarrete, Kurzban, Fessler, & Kirkpatrick, 2004). On this account,
worldview defense arises from an adaptation for broadcasting in-group allegiance to solicit
help and to foster social relations in times of need (Kirkpatrick & Navarrete, 2006;
Navarrete & Fessler, 2005). Finally, uncertainty management theory argues that mortality-
salience spurs worldview defense because death numbers among a range of topics about
which people are profoundly unsure or regard as conflicting with their personal goals. From
this perspective, cues of personal uncertainty or other poignant threats motivate
exaggeratedly definite, “zealous” cultural stances that assuage the anxiety that would
otherwise follow (McGregor, 2006; McGregor & Marigold, 2003; McGregor, Zanna,
Holmes, & Spencer, 2001).
2This theory should not be confused with Gudykunst’s (1993) anxiety/uncertainty management theory of interpersonal
communication.
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The terror, coalition, and uncertainty management accounts contest the evolved origins and
nature of the mechanisms underlying worldview defense.3 For example, terror management
theory ascribes worldview defense to a cognitive adaptation engineered by natural selection
to resolve the potential for debilitating fear posed by early humans’ “burgeoning awareness
of the inevitability of death” (Landau et al., 2007, p. 490). As the principal architects of
terror management theory made plain, “unique support for [terror management theory] is
predicated on the assumption that mortality salience effects are engendered specifically by
concerns about one’s own mortality rather than in response to any anxiety-provoking or self-
threatening event” (Greenberg et al., 1997, p. 98). Consequently, the repeated findings that
coalitional or uncertainty primes engender worldview defense pose a serious challenge to
terror management theory. Recent defenses of terror management theory attempt to counter
this mounting evidence, explaining that
many events not directly tied to death remind people of death anyway … For
example, [uncertain] thoughts of what a place where significant events from one’s
life occurred will be like 35 years from today are likely to highlight the transient
nature of life (McGregor et al., 2001); thoughts of uncertainty may remind one of
the flimsy nature of one’s views about the world (van den Bos, 2001); and thoughts
of being robbed [manipulated in coalitional psychology studies] may bring to mind
the very real possibility that the robbery will entail the threat of potentially lethal
violence. (Landau et al., 2007, p. 504)
However, the argument that uncertainty or coalition primes cause worldview defense
because they indirectly induce mortality-salience overlooks the manipulation checks that
uncertainty management and coalitional psychology researchers have conducted to confirm
that death thoughts are not inadvertently aroused by their manipulations (Navarrete et al.,
2004, Study 2; van den Bos, 2001; van den Bos, Poortvliet, Maas, Miedema, & van den
Ham, 2005).
From the coalitional psychology perspective, “the mortality-salience phenomena
documented by terror management researchers are best explained as the social-cognitive
output of a system of adaptive mechanisms that facilitate the formation of social networks,
interpersonal attachments, and coalitions” (Navarrete & Fessler, 2005, p. 307). Thoughts of
death, therefore, elicit
increased endorsement of the normative beliefs of the ingroup primarily because
the likely common causes of death in ancestral environments (dire illness, disease,
severe bodily harm, and starvation) were conditions in which successfully
acquiring increased social support (and perhaps, avoiding outgroup members)
would have had significant fitness consequences. (Kirkpatrick & Navarrete, 2006,
p. 294)
Given the fitness benefits of affiliating with others more intensely following cues of
“situations that pose adaptive problems for the individual that could conceivably be
effectively addressed using the support of allies” (Kirkpatrick & Navarrete, 2006, p. 295),
the coalitional relations approach argues that selection should have favored the design of
psychological mechanisms that heighten group normativity upon detection of coalitionally
relevant threats. Consistent with this proposal, subtle reminders of robbery and social
isolation have led to worldview defense in several studies (Navarrete, 2005; Navarrete et al.,
3Our discussion of the uncertainty management account of the phylogenetic origins of worldview defense focuses on the proposals of
McGregor and colleagues (e.g., McGregor, 2006). In a recent article, however, van den Bos et al. (2008) also advanced the possibility
that some uncertainty-salience effects on evaluation owe to an ancient background threat-detection mechanism. The threat-detection
mechanism sketched by the van den Bos group is left somewhat open and should not necessarily be equated with the goal-pursuit
system hypothesized by McGregor and his fellow researchers.
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2004). Coalitional psychology theory synthesizes these findings with the numerous reports
that reminders of uncertainty also produce worldview defense on the grounds that because
“others are often able to provide direction and aid in uncertain situations … these results are
consistent with our thesis that increases in normative orientation are ultimately aimed at
recruiting assistance” (Kirkpatrick & Navarrete, 2006, p. 295).
Note that the terror management and coalitional relations perspectives differ not only in
emphasis on the benefits of worldview defense but also with respect to the underlying
psychological adaptation postulated as mediating worldview defense. According to
coalitional psychology theory,
the central finding of terror management research—that participants in
psychological studies who contemplate their corporeal death display greater
support for the normative views of the ingroup—can be reinterpreted as an
illustration of how individuals become more normative in their ideological
orientation because of the benefits attending ingroup-affiliative behavior, [an
adaptive function owing to] psychological mechanisms designed to increase
normative mental representations that undergird the maintenance and formation of
social relationships. (Navarrete & Fessler, 2005, pp. 309–310)
Terror management theory rebuts the coalitional approach on evolutionary principles,
arguing that
their proposed mechanism seems far too domain general, both in terms of its
purported inputs and [affiliative] outputs, to be plausible as an evolved adaptation.
In contrast, terror management theory posits a set of defenses to address a specific
adaptive problem that has far-reaching consequences—the potential for debilitating
anxiety resulting from awareness of the inevitable thwarting of one’s life and
virtually all one strives for. (Landau et al., 2007, p. 502)
As the above quotes demonstrate, the terror management and coalitional psychology
accounts of worldview defense stress the domain-specificity of a hypothesized
psychological adaptation engineered either to allay death anxiety or recruit allies by
affirming cultural values. The unconscious vigilance account offers an elegant alternative:
Worldview defense tokens the capacity to become sensitized to affective stimuli following
subtle alarm. If so, then the worldview defense data accumulated over the past decades owe
to an unconscious vigilance capacity that evolved irrespective of the domain of cultural
attitudes but that is capable of influencing incidental evaluations of cultural attitudes to the
extent that they inspire pleasant or aversive feelings.
Why consider unconscious vigilance an alternative to adaptationist explanations of the
worldview defense effect? Some might argue, to the contrary, that the unconscious vigilance
model actually complements adaptationist proposals by sketching in the proximal means
through which terror management or coalitional psychology adaptations generate worldview
defense to achieve their respective ultimate ends. This “distinct levels of description” view
is misleading, however, because Darwinian adaptations are identified according to proximal
mechanisms that possess discriminative design attributes precisely corresponding to their
functions, like keys fitting locks (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005; G. C. Williams, 1966). A broad
class of subtle alarms may theoretically initiate unconscious vigilance, and subsequent
evaluations of incidental affective targets may be biased whether or not they pertain to
cultural attitudes. Therefore, interpreting worldview defense as simultaneously the result of
unconscious vigilance and a psychological device specific to cultural attitudes and some
narrow class of threats would violate the principle of domain-specificity used to distinguish
genuine psychological adaptations from adaptive byproducts (Buss, Haselton, Shackelford,
Bleske, & Wakefield, 1998; Thornhill, 1997).
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The potential for usefulness to be mistaken for special design has been recognized since the
inception of Darwinian theory, as Darwin himself illustrated:
The sutures in the skulls of young mammals have been advanced as a beautiful
adaptation for aiding parturition, and no doubt they facilitate, or may be
indispensable for this act; but as sutures occur in the skulls of young birds and
reptiles, which have only to escape from a broken egg, we may infer that this
structure has arisen from the laws of growth, and has been taken advantage of in
the parturition of the higher animals. (Darwin, 1860, p. 220)
Like mammalian infant skull sutures, adaptive psychological traits may arise as by-products
of structures that evolved for other reasons (Andrews, Gangestad, & Matthews, 2002; Gould
& Vrba, 1982). If a terror management or coalitional psychology adaptation has been
designed to output increased investment in cultural values following reminders of death or
the need for allies, then both the inputs to and outputs of the underlying architecture should
evince domain-specificity: Only the postulated class of death or coalition-related threats
should trigger worldview defense, and the inputs that trigger worldview defense should not
polarize evaluations of affective targets unrelated to cultural values. The exact reverse holds
for the claim that worldview defense is a by-product of unconscious vigilance: The alarm
cues that produce worldview defense should not be limited to death or coalitional concerns,
and they should foster biased evaluations of affective targets that are unrelated to cultural
attitudes.
The uncertainty management construal of worldview defense differs from the claims of
terror management theory or coalitional psychology in that the underlying psychological
mechanism is proposed to respond to an unrestricted class of goal-conflicts (Inzlicht,
McGregor, Hirsh, & Nash, 2009; McGregor, 2006). According to uncertainty management
theory, a phylogenetically ancient neural complex that evolved to enable goal-pursuit
registers cues of personal uncertainty— or any other sort of poignant self-threat—as a goal-
conflict. Upon detecting a goal-conflict (e.g., a mortality-salience prime), this system is said
to propagate goal-pursuit by mustering “defensive zeal” via connections with higher cortical
centers, which represent personal convictions and worldview ideals as high-level personal
goals (for a detailed account of this model, see McGregor, 2006). Given that a wide array of
subtle threats that do not concern mortality have been shown to evoke worldview defense,
uncertainty management theory concludes that “the common theme across the defensive
outcomes may be more parsimoniously recognized as zeal than as symbolic immortality
conferred by the successful adherence to cultural values” (McGregor, 2006, p. 302).
Worldview defense, on this view, reflects the emphatic affirmation of personal goals to
reduce the anxiety attendant to goal-conflict and to “re-engage feelings of hope and
strength” (McGregor, 2006, p. 299). Such “zealously” polarized evaluations “may take the
form of value convictions, communal commitment, closed-minded certainty, angry
jingoism, religious fervor, or political extremism” because all of these expressions
ostensibly strengthen representations of high-level personal goals (McGregor, 2006, p. 299).
Uncertainty management theory does not interpret worldview defense as the output of a
mechanism uniquely evolved to strengthen cultural convictions, but rather as the product of
a goal pursuit system co-opted to strengthen cultural convictions (qua high-level goals).
Thus, although both the uncertainty management and unconscious vigilance models portray
worldview defense as co-opting ancient processes that predate the development of “cultural
worldviews” in homo sapiens, the hypothesized mechanisms are quite distinct. Uncertainty
management theory casts worldview defense as a functional reengagement of goal-pursuit
by affirming high-level goals, whereas the unconscious vigilance hypothesis casts
worldview defense as a token example of enhanced sensitivity to incidental affective stimuli
following background alarm. Accordingly, the unconscious vigilance model predicts that
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perceptions of valenced targets will be polarized in the aftermath of subtle alarm cues
whether or not they pertain to cultural values or other high-level personal goals, whereas
uncertainty management theory predicts that perceptions of targets unrelated to cultural
values or personal goals should be irrelevant to the hypothesized goal-pursuit mechanism
and therefore unaffected. Furthermore, the unconscious vigilance model is agnostic about
whether exaggerating ratings of stimuli pertaining to cherished cultural values “defensively”
alleviates anxiety.
As different as the three previous perspectives on worldview defense are, it should be
acknowledged that each group has conceded that worldview defense might serve multiple
functions or derive from multiple motivations (e.g., Landau et al., 2007; Navarrete, 2005;
van den Bos et al., 2005). Regardless, all three theories propose adaptations either
specifically designed (as terror management and coalitional psychology theory argue) or co-
opted (as uncertainty management theory argues) to exacerbate adherence to group values.
Skeptical of these claims of a special relationship between certain unconscious threat cues
and investment in cultural values, we resolved to test the input– output discriminativity of
the mechanisms underlying worldview defense.
Previous Attempts to Rule Out Explanations Such as Unconscious
Vigilance
A casual reading of the literature might suggest that the unconscious vigilance interpretation
of worldview defense has already been ruled out by prior efforts to establish the domain-
specificity of the underlying architecture. On the input side of the equation, for instance,
terror management researchers have compared mortality-salience induction with
manipulations involving aversive topics such as public speaking, failing important exams, or
suffering intense dental pain, to test the alternative hypothesis that the threat-value
associated with death engenders worldview defense rather than factors unique to the concept
of death (Greenberg et al., 1997). These control manipulations lead participants to self-
report increased negative affect but do not induce worldview defense. Conversely, subtle
death cues engender worldview defense but do not increase self-reported negative affect
(Greenberg et al., 1995; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999). Analogously to
mortality-salience manipulations, coalition primes (e.g., thoughts of social isolation) and
uncertainty primes have engendered worldview defense without influencing self-report
measures of affect (McGregor et al., 2001; Navarrete & Fessler, 2006; Navarrete et al.,
2004; van den Bos et al., 2005). Coalitional psychology theory draws on these findings to
contest the terror management claim that only death-related manipulations evoke worldview
defense, but it shares the basic terror management position that the role of indiscriminate
threat-related affect (e.g., related to thoughts of failing an exam or delivering a public
speech) has been ruled out. As Navarrete and Fessler (2005) argued,
contemplating failing an exam or having to give a speech should not be expected to
provoke the same shifts in normative cognitions since these scenarios do not
concern fitness-relevant challenges in which coalitions could conceivably be a part
of an adaptive solution to the problem. (p. 308)
Thus, much as terror management theory posits the uniqueness of mortality-salience effects,
the coalitional psychology perspective suggests that aversive prospects that do not implicate
coalitional solutions should not inspire worldview defense.
Crucially, the terror management and coalitional psychology explanations of why aversive
control primes fail to inspire worldview defense overlook the likelihood that awareness of
conscious upset negates the influence of these manipulations. The self-reported distress
associated with such control primes (e.g., imagining a painful dental procedure) indicates
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that the induction triggered emotion regulation likely to avert subsequent worldview defense
bias. The notion that awareness of extraneous influences on one’s feelings can diminish or
negate bias is not controversial (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994; Kehner, Locke, &
Aurain, 1993; Martin, Harlow, & Strack, 1992). For example, Schwarz and Clore (1983)
found that participants reported greater life satisfaction in telephone interviews when called
on sunny versus rainy days, but that this effect was eliminated if the interviewer referenced
the weather in a private aside, thus directing participants to recognize this unrelated affective
influence. On the other hand, individuals are more likely to produce biased evaluations of
incidental targets following affective primes when unaware of having been influenced (for
reviews, see Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Pham, 2007; Schwarz & Clore, 2007;
Winkielman, Knutson, Paulus, & Trujillo, 2007). In fact, entirely unconscious valenced
stimuli can influence judgments of liking or disliking without arousing awareness of
emotional influence (for reviews, see Winkielman & Berridge, 2004; Winkielman, Berridge,
& Wilbarger, 2005a). These precedents indicate that, absent awareness of their influence,
aversive cues unrelated to death or coalitional relations may indeed initiate unconscious
vigilance and potentiate worldview defense.
On the output side of the equation, the unconscious vigilance model indicates that a wide
array of emotional targets should be evaluated with bias whether or not they relate to
cultural attitudes. In one of the earliest worldview defense studies, Rosenblatt, Greenberg,
Solomon, Pyszczynski, and Lyon (1989, Study 4) anticipated and tested the possibility that
worldview defense reflects heightened sensitivity to affective valence rather than cultural
ideologies in particular. In apparent support of the discriminative validity of worldview
defense, they found that ratings of activities such as “getting a good night’s sleep” or “sitting
through a boring lecture” were not biased by mortality-salience. Nevertheless, and as the
researchers openly acknowledged, this finding may have resulted from participants’ lack of
engagement with the target items: Reading an ostensibly genuine derogation or praising of
one’s group seems likely to evoke a greater emotional reaction than pale phrases such as
“getting a good night’s sleep.”
To follow-up on the possibility that some form of implicit arousal drives worldview defense
rather than a dedicated terror management mechanism, Rosenblatt et al. (1989, Study 5) next
tested pulse rate, pulse volume, and skin conductance after inducing mortality-salience, and
again they found no significant effects. However, this null result is actually in line with
observed dissociations between neural and autonomic reactions to threat. L. M. Williams et
al. (2006), for example, observed that exposure to subliminal fearful faces correlated with
activation of the amygdala and the anterior cingulate but not with increases in skin
conductance amplitude (also see Whalen et al., 1998). In direct support of the notion that
subtle death cues trigger unconscious threat reactions, Arndt, Allen, and Greenberg (2001)
correlated subliminal exposure to the word “dead” with rapid flashes of implicit negative
affect using facial electromyography. These findings suggest that unconscious threat-
detection produces a relatively subtle bodily response, just as one might expect given the
consistent lack of self-reported negative affect following mortality-salience induction.
Indeed, it would be strange for participants who self-report no conscious changes in affect to
evince notable changes in heart rate, blood pressure, or perspiration, because such bodily
cues are in themselves largely constitutive of subjective emotional experience (Prinz, 2004).
In sum, unconscious vigilance remains a plausible explanation of the psychological process
at play given the insufficiency of previous attempts to establish the discriminative validity of
either the eliciting primes or worldview defense itself. The subtle threat manipulations used
in worldview defense research may trigger a state of intensified reactivity to valenced
stimuli, precipitating polarized evaluations of a wide range of pleasant and aversive targets
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provided that participants are unaware of having been influenced. If so, worldview defense
would number among indefinitely many token expressions of unconscious vigilance bias.
Testing Unconscious Vigilance
If, as terror management theory and coalitional psychology propose, there is a psychological
adaptation functionally designed to trigger worldview defense upon detection of death cues,
then mortality-salience should not exaggerate evaluations of stimuli devoid of ideological
significance (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). Likewise, mortality-salience should not bias ratings of
targets unrelated to cultural attitudes if, as argued by uncertainty management theory,
worldview defense bias reflects a special motivation to affirm cultural convictions following
poignant self-threats (McGregor, 2006). On the contrary, if death cues influence judgment
because of unconscious vigilance, then mortality-salience should polarize evaluations of
valenced stimuli that are unrelated to cultural worldviews. To test the unconscious vigilance
hypothesis, mortality-salience was induced prior to presentation of pleasant and aversive
worldview-neutral sounds (Study 1) and images (Study 2), rather than the flattering and
critical essays about participants’ in-groups used in standard worldview defense research
(e.g., Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994).
Just as the influence on affective evaluation targets should be indiscriminate, the
unconscious vigilance model predicts that unconscious threats should elicit worldview
defense whether or not they relate to death or coalition-implicating challenges. Therefore, in
Studies 3 and 4, we exposed participants to subliminal cues of death or more general threats
while maintaining the dependent measures of the standard worldview defense task.
Study 1
Method
Participants—Forty-three undergraduate students from Queen’s University Belfast were
recruited to participate in exchange for £4 (approximately $7 at the time of the study)
compensation. Two outliers of approximately 2 SDs from the mean of the main dependent
variable were excluded from the analyses (Kirk, 1995), leaving a sample of 31 women and
10 men, ranging in age from 18 to 23 years (M = 20.05, SD = 1.46).
Materials and procedure—Participants were escorted into the laboratory and told they
would be helping to pilot test several unrelated measures for use in future research.
Participants were seated in individual cubicles and tested in groups ranging in size from one
to three. All materials were presented via computer using the program Inquisit 3.0.1.0
(Millisecond Software, 2008), which randomly assigned participants to either the mortality-
salience condition or the control (television-salience) condition.
Following an initial demographic survey, participants completed two filler scales. Next,
participants in the mortality-salience condition were asked to respond to prompts commonly
used in terror management studies (e.g., Rosenblatt et al., 1989): (a) “Please briefly describe
the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you,” and (b) “Please jot down,
as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to your body as you physically die
and once you are physically dead.” Control participants were asked parallel questions about
watching television (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997).
Following the standard worldview defense procedure, participants completed the Positive
and Negative Affect Scales—Expanded Form (PANAS-X; Watson, & Clark, 1991) after the
mortality-salience manipulation. The PANAS-X measures consciously accessible affect by
asking participants to rate the extent to which they feel 60 affective states, with subscales
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assessing general negative and positive affect as well as specific negative emotions (fear,
hostility, guilt, sadness), positive emotions (joviality, self-assurance, attentiveness), and
other affective states (shyness, fatigue, serenity, and surprise). This measure also provides a
period of distraction and delay to decrease conscious awareness of the influence of the
mortality-salience manipulation (Greenberg et al., 1994).
For the dependent measure, participants were asked to rate two 6-s sounds. Analogously to
the positive and negative essays used in worldview defense research, one sound was
intended to be considered pleasant, and one was intended to be aversive. The sounds were
selected through pilot testing of eight pleasant and aversive sounds created by the first
author on the basis of his intuition. The pilot results indicated that of the initial array of
sounds, these two would be consistently experienced by participants as moderately pleasing
and displeasing in the intended pattern. The aversive sound was an abrupt burst of pink
noise. The pleasant sound was generated electronically using harmonious synthesized tones
and reverb. Sounds were presented in counterbalanced order at a loud but comfortable
volume using headphones. Following each sound, participants were asked to respond to two
questions: “How much do you like this sound?” and “How much would you like to hear this
sound again?” Participants answered using a 9-point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 9 =
extremely).
After the experiment, each participant was questioned for suspicion about the purpose of the
study and then received a debriefing and compensation. No participant evinced suspicion
that the manipulation and the sound evaluations were related.
Results
Sound evaluations—The two rating items were internally reliable for both the pleasant
sounds (Cronbach’s α = .80) and the aversive sounds (Cronbach’s α = .81). To compute
participants’ overall rating of each sound, the two ratings were averaged. In previous terror
management experiments, worldview defense has been calculated by subtracting the mean
rating of the author of a negative essay from the mean rating of the author of a positive essay
(e.g., Greenberg et al., 1994). Similarly, we calculated sound bias by subtracting the mean
rating of the aversive sound from the mean rating of the pleasant sound for each participant.
Mean sound bias in the mortality-salience condition was greater than in the control condition
(see Table 1). The difference in sound bias reached statistical significance, F(1, 39) = 4.84, p
< .04, η2 = .11. There were no significant effects of age, gender, or order of sound
presentation.
Self-reported affect—A multivariate analysis of variance performed on the 13 subscales
of the PANAS-X revealed no significant effects of condition. In addition, an analysis of
variance on the difference between positive and negative affect revealed no effect.
Discussion
Study 1 modified a standard procedure used to investigate worldview defense by presenting
pleasant and aversive sounds in place of flattering or critical essays about participants’ in-
groups. The results support the unconscious vigilance perspective. As predicted, the death
manipulation significantly biased judgments of the sound stimuli without influencing self-
reported affect. To the extent that aesthetic preferences for and against abstract sounds do
not constitute “defensive” affirmations of one’s cultural convictions, this result is at odds
with terror management, coalitional psychology, or uncertainty management theories of
worldview defense. However, the possibility remained that this finding was somehow an
artifact of the particular sounds employed, or of the domain of sound. To further establish
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the generality of the influence of mortality-salience on the evaluation of valenced stimuli,
we employed worldview-neutral image targets in Study 2.
Representational images were used in Study 2 to counter an anticipated terror management
objection to the abstract, nonrepresentational sounds employed in Study 1. In previous
research on the influence of death cues on judgments of abstract expressionist paintings,
terror management theorists claimed that reminders of death exacerbate the need for
meaningfulness that worldviews ostensibly provide but that nonrepresentational art obscures
(Landau, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Martens, 2006). Indeed, they found that
mortality-salience led to greater aesthetic dislike of nonrepresentational art—a finding that
terror management investigators have cited as supportive but that we interpret as illustrative
of the arbitrariness of the valenced stimuli susceptible to evaluation bias. In Study 2, to
control for representation, participants rated valenced photographs of real-world scenes that
did not flatter, disparage, or particularly relate to cultural worldviews.
Study 2
Method
Participants—Forty-eight participants were recruited for an online study on “Personal
Attitudes & Perceptions” in exchange for inclusion in a raffle of £10 (approximately $13 at
the time of the study) Amazon.com gift certificates, with a one in 10 chance of winning.4
One outlier of approximately 2 SDs from the mean of the main dependent variable was
excluded from the analyses (Kirk, 1995), leaving a sample of 34 women and 13 men,
ranging in age from 18 to 65 years (M = 34.53, SD = 12.85).
Materials and procedure—Participants were initially asked to select a button on the
basis of correspondence to the last letter of their last name. This selection assigned them to
either the mortality-salience condition or the control condition. The subsequent demographic
questions, filler scales, death or television manipulations, and PANAS-X measures were
identical to those used in Study 1. All materials were presented using SurveyMonkey
(Finley, 2008).
For the dependent measure, participants were asked to rate two images, presented in
counterbalanced order. Like the sounds used in Study 1, one image was intended to be
considered pleasant, and one was intended to be considered aversive. The images were
selected through pilot testing of 14 intuitively pleasant and aversive images selected by the
first author. The pilot results indicated that these two images would be consistently
experienced as moderately pleasing and displeasing in the intended pattern. The aversive
image was of a hallway with a lightly stained carpet; the pleasant image was of a mountain
lake. Participants were asked to rate their agreement to three statements about each image: “I
like this image,” “I want to see more images like this,” and “I would like to be there.”
Participants answered using a 9-point Likert scale (1 = very strongly disagree, 9 = very
strongly agree).
At the close of the study, participants were asked what they thought the researchers were
expecting to find, and whether they recognized any questions from previous studies. No
participant evinced suspicion that the mortality-salience manipulation and the image
evaluations were related. Participants were thanked and debriefed on the final page.
4Previous pilot testing as well as Study 1 demonstrated that participants required a minimum of 10–15 min to complete these
materials. Therefore, to ensure that our online participants were attending appropriately, we explicitly stated that participants should
adopt a moderate pace, which would take approximately 15 min to complete. We then filtered the responses to exclude those who had
completed the study in less than 10 min.
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Results
Image evaluations—The three rating items were internally reliable for both the pleasant
images (Cronbach’s α = .96) and the aversive images (Cronbach’s α = .86). To compute
participants’ overall evaluation of each image, the three ratings were averaged. Image bias
was calculated by subtracting the average rating of the aversive image from the average
rating of the pleasant image for each participant. Mean image bias in the mortality-salience
condition was greater than in the control condition (see Table 1). The difference in image
bias was significant, F(1, 45) = 5.02, p < .03, η2 = .10. There were no significant effects of
age, gender, or order of image presentation.
Self-reported affect—A multivariate analysis of variance performed on the 13 subscales
of the PANAS-X revealed no significant effects of condition. In addition, a separate analysis
of variance on the difference between positive and negative affect revealed no effect.
Discussion
Study 2 modified Study 1 by testing the influence of mortality-salience on ratings of
worldview-neutral images rather than sounds. As predicted by the unconscious vigilance
model, mortality-salience led to exaggeratedly contrastive evaluations of pleasant versus
aversive images. Studies 1 and 2 indicate that death cues bias judgments of incidental
affective stimuli on the basis of the intensified feelings that the stimuli elicit rather than their
ideological content. These results indicate that cultural convictions are important for the
worldview defense effect only to the extent that they imbue evaluation targets with affective
valence.
Study 3
The results of Studies 1 and 2 illustrate the indiscriminativity of the influence of mortality-
salience on evaluations of valenced targets, supporting the unconscious vigilance model. We
turned next to testing the discriminativity of the input primes that may produce worldview
defense. Previous researchers have established that nondeath manipulations (e.g., reminders
of social isolation, robbery or feeling uncertain) create worldview defense without
heightening accessibility to thoughts of death (McGregor et al., 2001; Navarrete et al., 2004;
van den Bos et al., 2005). Nevertheless, entirely unconscious, subliminal death cues have
been shown to produce worldview defense when compared with aversive, nondeath control
cues (Arndt et al., 2001; Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1997; Dechesne,
Janssen, & van Knippenberg, 2000; Dechesne et al., 2003). To test the discriminativity of
death cues at a subliminal level of processing, therefore, subliminal death and nondeath
stimuli were manipulated in Study 3.
The amygdala, an integral structure for vigilance to environmental threats (LeDoux, 1996;
Liddell et al., 2005; Whalen et al., 1998), responds more strongly to emotive faces than to
other covertly presented emotional stimuli (Hariri, Tessitore, Mattay, Fera, & Weinberger,
2002). We therefore exposed participants to subliminal threatening face stimuli to employ a
previously validated way of inducing unconscious threat-detection in neural regions
implicated by the unconscious vigilance model.
Method
Participants—One hundred and forty-seven participants were recruited online to complete
a “5-Minute Study on Gender Identification and Social Attitudes.” Participation was unpaid
and available only to American citizens over 18 years of age. As a manipulation check,
worldview defense studies typically screen participants whose worldview orientation would
not be relevant (e.g., Greenberg, Arndt, Schimel, Pyszcznski, & Solomon, 2001; Navarrete
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et al., 2004). In this online study, we established worldview orientation by filtering out
participants who rated the anti- U.S. author more highly than the pro-U.S. author. For the
same reason, we removed participants who reported that they were of Latin American
descent, because the target essays involved Latin American immigrants who were intended
to be out-group members from the point of view of the participants. Participants who made
errors during the easy task that masked the subliminal manipulation were removed from
analysis because of suspicion that they were not paying attention. Two outliers of
approximately 3 SDs from the mean of the dependent variable were also removed (Kirk,
1995). This left a sample of 67 women and 25 men, ranging in age from 18 to 60 years (M =
25.28, SD = 8.93). Of the participants, 72.8% identified as White, 10.9% identified as Black,
5.4% identified as Asian, and 10.9% identified as other.
Procedure—After obtaining demographic information, participants were asked to classify
a series of faces according to gender. This task actually provided an opportunity to
subliminally prime participants with four randomly assigned between-subjects conditions:
positive cue (happy faces), threat cue (angry faces), death cue (skulls), and control (neutral
faces).
Modifying a procedure used by Winkielman, Berridge, and Wilbarger (2005b), the
subliminal face images were embedded between the plainly visible neutral faces of men and
women used in the gender identification task. Angry faces were used as negatively valenced
stimuli associated with threat but not particularly related to death. Happy faces were
presented as an exploratory test of whether cues of reward would influence participants’
author evaluations.5 The subliminal and supraliminal face stimuli were taken from the
Japanese and Caucasian Facial Expressions of Emotion (JACFEE; Matsumoto & Ekman,
1988) set and converted to gray-scale. In addition, images of a subliminal skull of the same
color and dimensions as the faces were presented as the mortality-salience manipulation.
The skull image was formatted to match the background of the JACFEE set. All materials
were presented using the software platform Inquisit 3.0.1.0 (Millisecond Software, 2008).
The gender classification task consisted of a practice block and an experimental block of
eight trials each. The experimental block consisted of eight priming trials because previous
research has found eight trials to maximally activate the amygdala without inducing
habituation (Whalen et al., 1998; Winkielman et al., 2005b). During the practice block,
subliminal neutral faces were interpolated between the visible neutral faces. Each trial began
with a forward mask (a cross shape) presented for 50-ms, followed by a 32-ms subliminal
image, followed by a plainly visible male or female face as the backward mask (see Figure
1). The visible male or female face remained on the screen until the participant entered a
gender classification response, at which point the next trial immediately commenced. The
visible faces never repeated—16 different male and female neutral faces were presented in
random order, divided evenly by gender and ethnicity. The subliminal experimental
sequences presented one repeated skull image or four different angry, happy, or neutral
(control) faces, randomized within valence. Only one skull image was formatted for
subliminal presentation because forward-facing skulls appear nearly identical.
After the gender identification task, participants were asked to read two essays ostensibly
written by immigrants from Latin America. The text for these essays was taken directly from
previous terror management research (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990). One essay was
5The only instance of a potential positively valenced prime previously used in worldview defense research that we are aware of is
Carlos Navarrete’s (2005) cooperative house-building prime presented in a study conducted in rural Costa Rica. However, although
this manipulation was intended to be positively valenced, it is unclear just what the unconscious affective response of the participants
may have been to the prospect of soliciting their community for help to build a new house.
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complementary toward the United States and the other was critical. The essays were
presented in counterbalanced order as photos of handwritten paragraphs (Arndt et al., 2001).
After reading each essay, participants were asked to rate its author according to a modified
version of the Interpersonal Judgment Scales (IJS; Byrne, 1971), which has been adopted for
use in previous worldview defense research (e.g., Greenberg et al., 2001; Navarrete &
Fessler, 2006; Navarrete et al., 2004). Participants clicked one of nine horizontally displayed
buttons with their mouse to rate their agreement with the following seven statements about
each author on a 9-point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 9 = extremely): (a) “This person is
likable,” (b) “This person is intelligent,” (c) “This person is well-informed,” (d) “This
person is moral,” (e) “This is the kind of person I would like to work with,” (f) “This person
is honest,” and (g) “This person is well-adjusted.”
Following the author ratings task, suspicion was checked by asking participants to provide
any ideas they had about the intent of the experiment. As a manipulation check, participants
were also asked whether they noticed any hidden or subtle images during the gender
identification task. If so, they were asked to describe what they may have observed. No
participant evinced suspicion of the actual intent of the study or that covert images were
embedded within the gender identification task. Finally, participants were thanked,
debriefed, and encouraged to forward the study to any American citizen over the age of 18
years whom they thought would be interested.
Results
Author evaluations—The seven IJS ratings items were internally reliable (Cronbach’s α
= .85 for both the pro-U.S. author and the anti-U.S. author). Following previous terror
management analyses, worldview defense was computed by subtracting the mean rating of
the anti-U.S. author from the mean rating of the pro-U.S. author (e.g., Greenberg et al.,
1994). Planned contrasts between the neutral condition and each of the experimental
conditions revealed that only exposure to subliminal angry faces led to a statistically
significant increase in worldview defense, F(1, 47) = 4.54, p < .04, η2 = .09 (see Table 2).
The happy face and skull manipulations did not show significant effects on author ratings
(ps > .3). There were no significant effects of age, gender, ethnicity, or order of presentation.
Discussion
Whereas Studies 1 and 2 tested the scope of the outputs of the process responsible for
worldview defense, we reversed tactics in Study 3 by testing the generality of the input
variable. We predicted that both the angry face and skull manipulations would lead to
worldview defense; the happy face manipulation was introduced as an exploratory test of the
influence of unconscious cues of reward.
As predicted, exposure to subliminal angry faces evoked worldview defense, a finding that
is consistent with unconscious vigilance but that contradicts terror management theory.
Although previous studies have also demonstrated that worldview defense reliably follows
nondeath manipulations (e.g., Navarrete, 2005; Navarrete et al., 2004; van den Bos et al.,
2005), this is the first time that an aversive nondeath cue has been shown to evoke
worldview defense via a subliminal pathway. This result is consistent with the coalitional
psychology interpretation of worldview defense, as angry faces obviously cue a fitness-
relevant threat better resolved with social aid. Nonetheless, the coalitional perspective
cannot readily account for the indiscriminative bias of worldview-neutral sound and image
targets observed in the first two studies.
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Unexpectedly, participants in the skull condition did not exhibit worldview defense. The
failure of the skull manipulation to exaggerate bias was surprising considering that
subliminal presentation of the words “death” or “dead” have previously promoted
worldview defense (Arndt et al., 2001; Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1997;
Dechesne et al., 2000) and have been correlated with flashes of negative affect measured
with facial electromyography (Arndt et al., 2001). However, given that the amygdala
responds primarily on the basis of eye contours (Whalen et al., 2004), the subliminal skull
images were likely processed as emotionally ambiguous or neutral because of their circular
eye sockets. Additionally, it is possible that the participants had become so habituated to the
omnipresent skull imagery present in contemporary media and fashion (Cassutt, 2008) that
the subliminal skulls harbored insufficient alarm connotations.
The lack of evaluation bias following happy face priming was not unexpected, considering
that previous studies of worldview defense have almost uniformly used threatening primes.
Nevertheless, if happy faces were processed by alarm mechanisms as salient reward cues,
then the happy face manipulation might be expected to facilitate worldview defense.
However, happy faces are relatively pale reward cues relative to, for instance, erotic
imagery. Moreover, the amygdala responds with less activation and quicker habituation to
happy versus fearful subliminal face stimuli (Whalen et al., 1998; Wright et al., 2001),
which may at least partly account for the present null result. Thus, as explored further in the
General Discussion, we do not interpret the present finding as compelling evidence against
the potential influence of stronger reward cues on worldview defense.
Study 4
Study 3 supported the unconscious vigilance prediction that a threat cue unrelated to death
(angry faces) would promote worldview defense bias. However, the failure of the skull
manipulation to engender bias prevented comparison of the relative influence of exposure
with subliminal death and nondeath threat stimuli. Study 4 was designed to amend this
shortcoming and to duplicate Study 3 in a different subliminal modality. In addition, Study 4
was intended to test whether a threat cue without a specific conceptual link to coalition-
relevant problems would produce worldview defense.
In previous studies of the effects of implicitly induced mortality-salience, Jamie Arndt and
colleagues (Arndt et al., 2001; Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1997; also see
Dechesne et al., 2000, 2003) presented subliminal sequences of either the word “dead” or
the word “pain” before a worldview defense measure. In these experiments, exposure to
“dead” elicited greater pro-U.S. bias than exposure to “pain,” suggesting that the word
“dead” carries a stronger negative connotation than “pain” when presented subliminally.
Notably, in the original terror management research series, subliminal “pain” fostered
greater pro-U.S. bias than subliminal “field,” which was used as an affectively neutral
control manipulation in a nearly identical study (Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, &
Solomon, 1997). Had they statistically compared the influence of exposure to subliminal
“pain” versus “field,” we speculate that they may indeed have found a worldview defense
effect caused by the “pain” manipulation. If unconscious vigilance underlies worldview
defense, then unconscious threat manipulations should elicit the effect whether or not they
pertain to death or coalitional relations. Thus, subliminal presentations of the words “dead”
and “pain” should both evoke worldview defense relative to “field,” with “dead” producing
greater bias as the more aversive prospective threat. Study 4 tested these predictions.
Method
Participants—Two hundred and seventy-seven participants were recruited online to
complete “Two Mini-Studies: Meaning Matching and Cultural Attitudes” in exchange for
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inclusion in a raffle of $10 Amazon.com gift certificates, with a one in 10 chance of
winning. Participation was available only to U.S. citizens over 18 years of age. The criteria
for inclusion were identical to those used in Study 3. Six outliers of approximately 3 SDs
from the mean of the dependent variable were also removed (Kirk, 1995). This left a sample
of 126 women and 65 men, ranging in age from 18 to 67 years (M = 33.17, SD = 11.98). Of
the participants, 75% identified as White, 4.7% identified as Black, 10.5% identified as
Asian, and 9.4% identified as other.
Procedure—Following demographic questions, participants were asked to perform a task
in which they classified pairs of words as meaningfully related or not. This task actually
provided an opportunity to subliminally prime participants with one of three randomly
assigned lexical manipulations: “field,” “pain,” or “dead.” Modifying a procedure used by
Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon (1997), the subliminal words were embedded
between plainly visible words used in the semantic relations task. For each trial, two words
were flashed sequentially on the computer. Participants then pressed either the “Q” or “P”
key to signify that the words were related or not related, respectively. For example, if they
saw the pair pencil and paper, they were to press the “Q” key, but if they saw such pairs as
tuxedo and forest, they were to press the “P” key. All materials were presented using the
software platform Inquisit 3.0.1.0 (Millisecond Software, 2008).
The semantic relations task consisted of a practice block and an experimental block of 10
trials each, following Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon (1997). During the
practice block, subliminal letter strings (e.g., “adbc”) were interpolated between the visible
words. Each trial began with a 1,000-ms pause, followed by the first word of the pair
presented for 428 ms, followed by the subliminal word presented for 32 ms, followed by the
second word presented for 428 ms. The next trial commenced as soon as the participant
entered his or her response. The related and unrelated word pairs were presented in random
order and were never repeated.
After the semantic relations task, participants were asked to complete the same author
ratings task used in Study 3. Following the author ratings task, suspicion was checked by
asking participants to provide any ideas they had about the intent of the experiment. No
participant evinced suspicion that the semantic relations task and the author ratings were
experimentally related. As a manipulation check, participants were also asked to describe
any “glitches” or “unexpected aspects” observed during the semantic relations task. Next,
they were asked to state whether they had or had not observed any hidden words during the
task, and then were asked to select which of the following words may have been disguised:
field, hurt, love, dead, food, numb, sex, and pain. Finally, participants were thanked,
debriefed, and encouraged to forward the study to any U.S. citizen over the age of 18 years
whom they thought would be interested.
Results
Author evaluations—The seven IJS ratings items were internally reliable (Cronbach’s α
= .91 for the pro-U.S. author, Cronbach’s α = .94 for the anti-U.S. author). Worldview
defense was again computed by subtracting the mean rating of the anti-U.S. author from the
mean rating of the pro-U.S. author. Planned contrasts revealed that both experimental
manipulations significantly increased pro-U.S. bias (see Table 3). Subliminal “pain” induced
worldview defense, F(1, 144) = 3.93, p < .05, η2 = .03; subliminal “dead” induced
worldview defense, F(1, 100) = 10.61, p < .01, η2 = .11. There were no significant effects of
age, gender, ethnicity, or order of presentation.
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Manipulation checks—Of the participants, 98.4% did not report any glimpses of hidden
content during the semantic relations task when asked in an open-ended question. Next,
when directly asked whether they believed that they may have been exposed to any hidden
words or messages, 62.3% of participants selected “No.” Of the minority who selected
“Yes,” 19.7% correctly selected the word that was subliminally presented from a list of eight
options; 14.7% of total participants correctly guessed which of the eight words they were
subliminally exposed to.
Discussion
As predicted, both the subliminal “pain” and “dead” manipulations led to worldview
defense, supporting the unconscious vigilance hypothesis but challenging the terror
management claim that subliminal mortality-salience inductions generate worldview defense
uniquely. Furthermore, the degree of experimentally induced pro-U.S. bias adhered to the
predicted pattern, with “dead” producing the highest level of bias and “pain” intermediate
between “dead” and “field.” The “pain” manipulation exhibited a notably weak effect
relative to the robust “dead” manipulation. The disproportionate influence of the two primes
is consistent with the commonsense notion that implicit cues of death are more threatening
than cues of pain, and may explain how contrasts of implicit “pain” manipulations and
“dead” manipulations have produced significant differences in previous terror management
studies.
Whereas Study 3’s implicit threat manipulation, angry faces, qualified as a coalitional prime,
the subliminal word “pain” does not designate a circumstance implicative of a need for
coalitional aid in particular. Thus, the results of Study 4 are difficult to reconcile with the
coalitional interpretation of the computational mechanisms supposed to produce worldview
defense. Study 4 also supports the unconscious vigilance hypothesis by extending Study 3’s
finding that subliminal nondeath face primes can engender worldview defense to an
alternate modality.
General Discussion
We found support for the unconscious vigilance hypothesis across four studies. Studies 1
and 2 demonstrate that mortality-salience biases judgments of worldview-neutral sounds and
images, contradicting the discriminative validity of worldview defense as the output of a
system designed to increase adherence to cultural values. When taken together, Studies 3
and 4 show that subliminal threats unrelated to death or coalition-relevant problems can
evoke worldview defense. In the concluding discussion, the implications of these findings
for functional perspectives on worldview defense are examined, followed by directions for
future background alarm, evaluation bias, and emotion regulation research.
Implications for Evolutionary Accounts of Worldview Defense
The present results challenge all three prior evolutionary interpretations of worldview
defense. Terror management theory and coalitional psychology characterize worldview
defense as the output of a functional adaptation designed to allay death anxiety or recruit
allies by exacerbating commitment to cultural values, but our studies show that the inputs to
the underlying process transcend death or coalitional concerns, and the outputs transcend the
domain of cultural values. Worldview defense therefore appears better explained as a by-
product of unconscious vigilance than as the output of a terror or coalition management
adaptation.
The tensions between the present findings and the uncertainty management framework are
more subtle. Uncertainty management theory portrays worldview defense as a “zealous”
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affirmation of cultural convictions (i.e., high-level personal goals), but Studies 1 and 2 found
that mortality-salience elicits exaggerated ratings of sound and image targets unrelated to
cultural convictions. Nonetheless, seeking pleasing and avoiding displeasing noises or sights
could be considered the pursuit of concrete, low-level goals that have no particular
connection to cultural values or identity, but that nonetheless derive from the anxiety-
reduction/goal-pursuit system described by uncertainty management theory (McGregor,
2006). Furthermore, producing exaggerated ratings of valenced targets when unconsciously
vigilant may reduce anxiety, or at least discharge the state of background alarm (which may
or may not be aptly conceptualized as a form of low-level anxiety), much as argued within
uncertainty management theory. If unconscious vigilance evolved to facilitate conscious
identification of the environmental element that initially triggered the state of background
alarm, then encountering affectively weighted (i.e., significant) stimuli could signal that the
vigilance elicitor has been identified, ending the state of alarm. If so, then the unconscious
vigilance account could be compatible with a construal of uncertainty management theory
that does not emphasize the relevance of deeply held personal convictions, cultural ideals, or
other high-level goals to evaluation bias (also see van den Bos et al., 2008).
Looking ahead, however, the uncertainty management premise that a goal-conflict detection
mechanism triggers worldview defense remains at odds with our model of unconscious
vigilance, which may be theoretically initiated by subtle alarm cues that do not involve goal-
conflicts. Although our presentation and present findings have focused on threats (i.e., goal-
conflicts), the neuroscience data on background alarm indicate that subtle cues of salient
rewards may also engage unconscious vigilance. The amygdala responds to unconscious
affective stimuli of positive as well as negative valence (Adolphs, 2008; Adolphs, Russell,
& Tranel, 1999; Davis & Whalen, 2001); erotic imagery, for instance, has been shown to
trigger amygdala reactivity without conscious awareness (Jiang, Costello, Fang, Huang, &
He, 2006). Likewise, subtle alarm cues such as background blinking lights or exclamation
marks that have previously swayed responses to injustice (van den Bos et al., 2008) may
initiate unconscious vigilance without designating goal-conflicts so much as a need for
accentuated attention. For the moment, however, this distinction between uncertainty
management and unconscious vigilance predictions remains theoretical. Further research is
required to ascertain the range of alarm cues that activate incidental evaluation biases such
as worldview defense.
The evolutionary origins of unconscious vigilance are also unclear at present. Unconscious
vigilance might be an adaptation designed to marshal identification of and responsiveness to
background hazards or resources. Alternatively, this capacity may have arisen as a useful
by-product of more encompassing systems, such as those evolved to facilitate executive
task-shifting from current focal objectives to new environmental demands. Ultimately, the
domain-specificity of the unconscious vigilance system must be empirically delineated
before functional design may be surmised. For example, are there particular types of
incidental affective targets that are immune to unconscious vigilance evaluation bias? Our
current results only show that unconscious detection of threat cues polarizes evaluation of an
array of affective targets, which can but need not relate to cultural values.
Worldview Defense as a Secondary Adaptation?
The unconscious vigilance dynamic explains exaggerated reactions to polarizing cultural
attitudes, but other complex conceptual processes are involved in forming cultural attitudes
that people relate to emotionally. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that worldview defense
indeed arose as a useful by-product of unconscious vigilance (e.g., which enabled persons
exposed to subtle threats in the ancestral past to better recruit allies, as argued within
coalitional psychology theory). Natural selection might have subsequently elaborated the
relationship between unconscious vigilance structures and social cognitive mechanisms
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supporting investment in cultural values, thereby enhancing the link between a subset of
inputs (e.g., coalitionally relevant threats) and outputs (e.g., displays of heightened cultural
chauvinism). If so, worldview defense would qualify as a secondary adaptation, much as a
proto-feather adaptation for thermal regulation in birds has been proposed by some to have
been selectively refined and repurposed for flight (Gould & Vrba, 1982).
At present, however, there are no evident grounds for supposing that such selective tinkering
occurred. As G. C. Williams (1966) prescribed, “an effect should be assumed to be the result
of physical laws only, or perhaps the fortuitous effect of some unrelated adaptation, unless
there is clear evidence that it is produced by mechanisms designed to produce it” (p. 261).
There is currently no direct evidence for or against the claim that heightened cultural
normativity following subtle threat actually increases fitness, but future debates may involve
ascertaining the circumstances in which unconscious vigilance generates fortuitous effects
related to affirming cultural worldviews. To the extent that worldview defense is eventually
determined to enhance fitness, it should be classified as an exaptation; to the extent that
worldview defense is found not to increase fitness, it should be classified as noise (Buss et
al., 1998; Gould & Vrba, 1982).
Beyond Worldview Defense: Individual Differences and Related Biases
We set out to test the discriminative validity of worldview defense, not the litany of effects
reported by terror, coalition, and uncertainty management researchers. To the extent that we
present our results as problematic for previous theories, however, we are obliged to propose
ways of theoretically reconciling our model with their wider data. The discussion that
follows is a preliminary effort to do so, tendered as no more than a plausible reframing of
individual difference effects on worldview defense and related biases as they might be
explicated in terms of unconscious vigilance.
Terror management researchers have investigated the effects of mortality-salience on an
array of ratings and behaviors, including aggression, ethnocentrism, political conservatism,
legal penalties, social stereotyping, and aesthetic preferences (see Table 4). In addition, a
number of experimentally manipulated or personality-based individual difference variables
(e.g., self-esteem, authoritarianism) have been found to influence mortality-salience induced
biases (for a review, see Landau et al., 2007). Largely parallel individual difference results
have been reported by coalitional psychology and uncertainty management investigators
(e.g., McGregor, Haji, Nash, & Teper, 2008; McGregor, Nash, & Inzlicht, 2009; Navarrete,
2005). The individual difference effects on worldview defense (and related biases) are
formidably diverse, but all seem to direct or nullify bias according to a straightforward
rubric: individually and culturally varying emotional investment in the primes or the targets.
On the prime side of the equation, the degree of threat connoted by a given topic depends on
the affective threat-index associated with it (Adolphs et al., 1999). When the prime involves
death, for example, a person who perceives death as less distressing should be less
susceptible to mortality-salience effects. Indeed, religiosity has been observed to reduce or
eliminate mortality-salience effects among populations whose religious views prefigure
secure afterlives (Jonas & Fischer, 2006; van den Bos, van Ameijde, & van Gorp, 2006)—
but not populations whose religious doctrines prefigure perilous afterlife experiences
(Holbrook, 2011). Self-esteem appears, like religiosity, to calibrate the degree of perceived
threat. For example, Greenberg et al. (1993) observed that high self-esteem reduced galvanic
skin response to the threat of an imminent electric shock. High self-esteem is also related to
approach-motivation, which neurological, behavioral, and self-report studies have correlated
with reductions in the startle-reflex and negative reactions to aversive stimuli (McGregor et
al., 2009). Threatmitigators such as self-esteem and religiosity may ameliorate threat-value,
explaining why these individual differences have been observed to reduce worldview
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defense following a wide range of death, coalitional threat, and uncertainty primes
(Greenberg, 2008; Navarrete, 2005).
However, self-esteem does not always mellow defensive reactions. When the evaluation
target directly relates to the basis of a person’s self-esteem, then self-esteem actually
exacerbates worldview defense following subtle threat (Arndt & Greenberg, 1999). A
parallel reversal holds for the influence of religiosity, which decreases mortality-salience
and uncertainty-salience effects on evaluation in most contexts, but not when the target
relates directly to religion (McGregor et al., 2008; van den Bos et al., 2006). Self-esteem and
religiosity, therefore, do more than attenuate threat-values—they also seem to index the
perceived significance of related targets (i.e., topics related to the basis of self-esteem or to
religion). Conceivably, self-esteem, religiosity, and other threatmitigators reduce, but do not
entirely eliminate, alarm activation in response to subtle threats, leaving individuals less
reactive to most targets yet more reactive to cherished targets related to that trait. Future
inquiry should probe how threat-mitigating traits can also marshal bias (for further
discussion, see McGregor et al., 2009).6
Idiosyncratic personal preferences for or against a given target may also be accentuated by
unconscious vigilance. Mortality-salience, for instance, leads highly neurotic, sensation-
averse participants to further minimize their exposure to tactile stimulation (Goldenberg et
al., 2006). Analogously, high group-identifiers—such as patriots, authoritarians, or
collectivists— register complementary or critical attitudes toward that group more acutely
(Landau et al., 2007; Navarrete, 2005). Such a preference-heightening dynamic may also
explain why risk-seeking individuals endorse greater willingness to engage in risky behavior
following mortality-salience, whereas risk-averse individuals endorse less (Rosenbloom,
2003). If a target is affectively denoted as relevant to you in a particular direction, then you
may be more prone to bias consonant with these preferences when unconsciously vigilant.
Unconscious Vigilance and Carryover Affect
The unconscious vigilance model of evaluation bias overlaps with traditional models of
carryover affect in key respects: Affective primes are depicted as biasing evaluations of
incidental targets, and conscious awareness of affective manipulation is thought to dispel
bias. However, standard models of affective carryover map trait or state-induced affect to
unrelated judgments consistent with their valence (e.g., rainy weather lowers ratings of
overall life satisfaction; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Unconscious vigilance, by contrast,
depicts intensified reactivity to affective targets as biasing judgment, not a consonant
“carrying over” of the valence of the manipulation. In this way, a negatively valenced alarm
manipulation (e.g., a subliminal pain prime) can evoke a stronger preference for a positively
valenced target.
Our studies, like the worldview defense experiments they were patterned on, employed
simple measures of preferences for and against valenced targets. Intriguingly, the appraisal-
tendency literature reports that emotion primes which produce similar preference biases can
produce distinct, or even opposing, cognitive biases based on the informational structure
intrinsic to the emotion (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). For example, fear and anger have been
observed to prompt similar decreases in liking, but opposing appraisals of risk (Lerner &
Keltner, 2000). Looking ahead, the possibility that unconsciously registered emotional cues
may influence informational appraisals remains a fascinating open question. Applying
6Further complicating predictions, distinct forms of self-esteem predict distinct action tendencies (Kirkpatrick, Waugh, Valencia, &
Webster, 2002). For example, self-esteem that is based on perceived mate value predicts hostility, whereas the reverse has been found
when self-esteem is rooted in social inclusion. Thus, unconscious vigilance may promote intensified hostility among those whose high
self-esteem is based on mate value, but not among those whose self-esteem is based on social inclusion (also see Leary, 2000).
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appraisal-tendency findings to worldview defense research, subtle manipulations involving
topics such as uncertainty, robbery, mortality, and social isolation may exert largely
equivalent influences on many sorts of liking judgments, but quite distinct biases on
judgments related to the appraisal-structure of the emotions elicited by the primes. We
therefore caution the reader not to mistake our argument—that worldview defense is better
explained by a relatively indiscriminate sensitization of preferences— as a claim against the
prospect of unique relationships between specific classes of subtle alarm inputs and other
informationally related evaluations.
Worldview Defense Without Unconscious Vigilance
Individuals discount intensified affective reactions when cognizant that these feelings may
be misleading. There are three important caveats regarding this regulatory capacity, each
indicating that unconscious vigilance is sufficient but not necessary to produce worldview
defense. First, although individuals tend to discount the informational relevance of their
negative feelings when the origins of those feelings are suspect, positive affect resists
discounting (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Consequently, manipulations that induce consciously
detectable positive feelings could conceivably prompt increased liking of the group-
affirming target, a form of worldview defense. Second, executive resources are required to
discount irrelevant affect; cognitive load should therefore potentiate worldview defense
despite an absence of distraction and delay following the alarm induction.7 Third, there are
limits to the capacity of executive regulation to discount intense feelings; overwrought
individuals may exhibit worldview defense despite awareness of incidental emotional
prejudice.
Conclusion
Why do participants affirm their worldviews more ardently following subtle threats? The
answer appears to be that subtle threats heighten our sensitivity to emotionally evocative
stimuli. In contexts involving the evaluation of cultural attitudes, this dynamic articulates as
“worldview defense”; analogous biases may be expected in alternate contexts. In this
manner, the unconscious vigilance architecture may interact with situational factors to
produce various functional and nonfunctional effects.
Although unconscious vigilance may be interpreted by some as a rather deflationary
explanation of the psychological process underlying worldview defense, understanding
factors that exacerbate or temper group prejudice remains vital. Terror management,
coalitional psychology, and uncertainty management researchers have amassed a valuable
corpus of data about the influence of subtle threats on a wide range of important social
perceptions, judgments, and behaviors. Moreover, the claim that alarm cues spur worldview
defense because of unconscious vigilance does not imply that there are no unique
psychological consequences of mortality-, coalition-, or uncertainty-salience. The ways in
which we confront death, nurture social relations, or resolve uncertainty all merit further
inquiry.
7In fact, terror management researchers have documented this dynamic: Cognitive load may be substituted for distraction and delay to
evoke worldview defense immediately following mortality-salience induction (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Simon,
1997). For similar reasons, persons who perform poorly on tasks that require executive inhibition, such as the Stroop task, may display
worldview defense despite awareness of incidental affective influence.
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Figure 1.
In Study 3, participants were primed with a series of subliminal emotion faces (or skulls)
embedded within a gender classification task (modified from Winkielman et al., 2005b).
Immediately following this task, participants rated the authors of a pair of pro- and anti-U.S.
essays. Note: The face images used in this figure are from the Japanese and Caucasian
Facial Expressions of Emotion (JACFEE) and Neutral Faces (JACNeuF) set (Matsumoto &
Ekman, 1988).
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Table 1
Influence of Mortality-Salience on Evaluations of Worldview-Neutral Stimuli
Bias type Control Death F
Sound bias (Study 1)
    M 4.98 6.24 4.84*
    SD 1.99 1.62
Image bias (Study 2)
    M 4.92 6.45 5.02*
    SD 2.69 1.81
*p < .05.
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Table 2
Influence of Exposure to Subliminal Faces on Pro-U.S. Bias
Experimental condition
Pro-U.S. bias Neutral Angry Happy Skull
    M 1.7a 2.65b 2.13a,b 2.04a,b
    SD 1.29 1.81 1.27 1.41
Note. Means with different superscripts are significantly different with alpha at .05.
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Table 3
Influence of Exposure to Subliminal Words on Pro-U.S. Bias
Experimental condition
Pro-U.S. bias Field Pain Dead
    M 1.53a 2.11b 2.5b
    SD 1.38 1.92 1.63
Note. Means with different superscripts are significantly different with alpha at .05.
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Table 4
Types of Evaluations Influenced by Mortality-Salience
Mortality-salience increases Studies
Worldview defense Greenberg et al., 1990
Religious conviction Jonas & Fischer, 2006
Stereotyping Schimel et al., 1999
Dislike of nonrepresentational art Landau et al., 2006
Dislike of public breastfeeding Cox et al., 2007
National identification Castano et al., 2004
Conformity to social norms Gailliot et al., 2008
Dislike of inconsistent behavior Landau et al., 2004
Dislike of sensation (for neurotics) Goldenberg et al., 2006
Desire for luxury goods Kasser & Sheldon, 2000
Desire to have children Wisman & Goldenberg, 2005
Belief in a just world Landau et al., 2004
Sun tanning to appear attractive Routledge et al., 2004
Seeing humans as unlike animals Goldenberg et al., 2001
Note. This list is intended to be representative but not exhaustive.
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